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Industrial Policy: Diverting
Resources from the Winners
Edwin L. Harper*
and
Lehmann K. Li, Jr.t
In the 1960s, the Japanese automobile industry comprised numerous com-
panies, each of which produced several different models. The Japanese Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) attempted to consolidate the industry
into two major companies because it believed that a fragmented industry could
not compete in the world market.' As evidenced by the numbers of Hondas,
Isuzus, Subarus, and Mazdas, as well as Toyotas and Nissans on American roads
today, MITI's attempted consolidation failed and the Japanese automobile indus-
try has competed very successfully as a fragmented industry. Fortunately for
Honda and the smaller Japanese automobile companies, they ignored the govern-
ment's advice and discounted its foresight. Japanese industrial policy appears to
have been less than successful in this case.
This article argues that the various forms of industrial policy currently being
proposed are inappropriate for the United States (U.S.). They would fail not only
on economic grounds, but on political grounds as well. The article outlines the
appropriate role for government in the economy.
Part I examines the reasons why industrial policies are being proposed. Part II
examines what those who advocate an industrial policy really mean. Parts III and
IV review the economic and political problems, respectively, associated with
industrial policy. Part V explores factors other than industrial policy that can
explain strong Japanese industrial competitiveness. Part VI presents the authors'
views of the appropriate role for government in the economy. Part VII reviews the
record of the United States in enhancing industrial competitiveness.
* Senior Vice President-Finance and Chief Financial Officer, Campbell Soup Company; Execu-
tive Vice President, Overhead Door Corporation; Assistant to the President, 1982-1983; Assistant to
the President and Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, 1981-1982. B.A. 1963,
Principia College; Ph.D. 1968, University of Virginia.
t Senior Staff Member, Office of Policy Development, The White House. A.B. 1978, Cornell
University; M.B.A. 1980, Stanford University.
1. See C. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY
1925-1975, at 286-88 (1982).
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I. WHY INDUSTRIAL POLICIES ARE BEING PROPOSED
Three factors have stimulated the current interest in industrial policy: sluggish
economic growth, technological change, and the increasing importance of for-
eign trade.
First, the back-to-back recessions in 1980 and 1981-1982 caused unemploy-
ment to rise as economic activity slowed down. The high levels of unemployment
stimulated a search for new economic policies that could generate growth and
employment. One of those "new" economic policies is "industrial policy."
Second, revolutionary technologies are helping transform the U.S. economy.
Technological advances like the microchip are simultaneously opening up vast
new possibilities and making obsolete many products and processes. While these
technological advances can dramatically increase productivity, they can also
cause adjustment difficulties in the economy. For example, flexible manufactur-
ing systems can eliminate the need for workers to set up, inspect, load, and
unload machine tools. A worker who has spent his entire working life operating a
machine tool may be forced to seek a new job and learn new skills.
Third, foreign trade, particularly in manufactured consumer goods, is becom-
ing increasingly important and visible in our economy. Between 1970 and 1983,
merchandise imports increased from 4.0 percent to 7.9 percent of gross national
product. For certain goods, imports have penetrated quickly. For example, im-
ports as a percent of auto sales in the U.S. by value rose from 7.9 percent in 1972
to 16.7 percent in 1983.2 Workers threatened with losing their jobs and companies
suffering losses because of cheaper or higher quality foreign products often
demand some kind of action from government. In many cases, management and
labor from industries losing sales to imports call for import restrictions or gov-
ernment subsidies.
II. WHAT EXACTLY IS INDUSTRIAL POLICY?
Like the inkblot in a Rorschach test, industrial policy means different things to
different people. To some, industrial policy means coordinating all government
policies affecting industry. Under this definition, generally available investment
tax credits, government grants to universities for basic research, and federal
government investment in interstate highways could all be elements of an "indus-
trial policy" since they affect the competitiveness of industry. Such a definition is
not particularly useful, though, since all government policies affect industry at
least indirectly. Defining industrial policy as all government policies affecting
industry requires that one include virtually every public economic and social
program. Public programs to reduce alchoholism, for example, would qualify as
part of an industrial policy because of the effect of alcoholism on the productivity
of the labor force.
In fact, most industrial policy proposals revolve around coordinating govern-
ment policies toward specific industries. The federal government would establish
2. BUREAU OF INDUS. ECONOMICS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1984 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK
31-35 (1984).
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a new body to develop industrial strategies. Four major proposals exist thus far:
Representative John J. LaFalce (D-N.Y.) has proposed a Council on Industrial
Competitiveness; 3 the House Democratic Caucus has proposed an Economic
Cooperation Council;4 the Senate Democratic Caucus has proposed a Council on
Economic Competitiveness and Cooperation;5 and the Center for National Policy
Industrial Study Group (co-chaired by Felix G. Rohatyn, a senior partner at
Lazard Freres & Co., Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO, and Irving
Shapiro, former Chairman of E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company) has pro-
posed an Industrial Development Board.
6
Comprising representatives from management, labor, and government, such a
body would, depending on the specific proposal, identify national priorities,
formulate a national industrial strategy, and develop a broad consensus for such a
strategy. For example, the Council proposed by Representative LaFalce would
"create a forum or forums where national leaders with experience and back-
ground in business, labor, academia, public interest activities, and Government
will identify national economic problems, develop recommendations to address
those problems, and create a broad consensus in support of those recommenda-
tions." 7 The Council proposed by the Senate Democratic Caucus would "be the
forum within which the Nation's industrial strategy will be debated and formu-
lated. "8
More important, a national industrial strategy would really consist of many
individual strategies for specific sectors or industries. For example, the Council
proposed by the House Democratic Caucus could convene a subcouncil for
"steel, an industry which needs restructuring, or for semiconductors, an industry
overseas competitors have targeted." 9 The Council proposed by the Senate
Democratic Caucus would "establish, after a request from the private sector,
advisory working groups to analyze and consider responses to problems that
affect individual industries .... "10
Typically, these individual strategies would involve the federal government
channeling resources toward specific technologies or industries. For example, the
government could provide special tax deductions or credits, grants, loans,ioan
guarantees, import relief, antitrust exemptions, or some combination of measures
to a particular industry. Most proposals would attempt to target both "declining"
and "emerging" industries or markets. The LaFalce proposal would "establish a
Bank for Industrial Competitiveness with power and resources sufficient to sup-
plement private and other public capital investment in the revitalization of mature
or linkage industries and the development of emerging industries."" The
3. See H.R. 4360, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
4. See THE NAT'L HOUSE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, RENEWING AMERICA'S PROMISE 24-26 (1984).
5. See SENATE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, JOBS FOR THE FUTURE 16-17 (1983).
6. See CENTER FOR NAT'L POLICY, RESTORING AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS: PROPOSALS FOR
AN INDUSTRY POLICY passim (1984).
7. H.R. 4360, supra note 3, at § 102.
8. SENATE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, supra note 5, at 16.
9. THE NAT'L HOUSE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, supra note 4, at 25.
10. SENATE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, supra note 5, at 16.
11. H.R. 4360, supra note 3, at § 2(b)(3).
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Rohatyn proposal would create an Industrial Finance Administration that would
provide capital as part of a development strategy. 2
A key feature in most proposals for a government industrial bank is that either
its board of directors would be drawn from the accompanying management-labor-
government council or the bank would be obliged to follow the recommendations
of the council. For example, the board of directors of the Bank proposed by
Representative LaFalce would include four members from the proposed Council
and eight members who, like members of the Council, "have substantial experi-
ence and expertise in the fields of business investment, industrial development,
or public or private finance." 13 The Rohatyn proposal would explicity require the
Bank to "operate under the jurisdiction of the Industrial Development Board"
and extend assistance "only as part of a development strategy adopted by the
Board. The charter would limit financial assistance to industries designated as
eligible by the Board." 14 Most proposed banks would essentially be extensions of
a tripartite council.
The fundamental premise underlying any of the council or federal bank pro-
posals is that government can outguess the market over the long term. While
some industrial policy advocates argue that the perceived necessity of "govern-
ment bureaucrats 'picking winners' . . . is the myth of contemporary public
debate on industrial policy," 5 in fact, industrial policy proposals would indeed
require "picking winners" and second-guessing the market. The first purpose of
a council would be to develop a broad national industrial strategy. In particular,
such an industrial strategy would "encourage the development of emerging in-
dustries that can provide substantial economic growth and employment' '16 and
"identify new trends and markets". 1 This strategy would have to pick winning
industries, trends and markets, because people certainly would not want a strat-
egy to pick losers.
The second purpose of a council would be to develop industrial strategies for
specific industries. The Rohatyn proposal states that "[i]f an industry asks for
help, and if it backs that request with a program that can help turn the industry
into a world-class competitor, government should have the capacity to act. "8 An
industry request for government help implies that the industry could not convince
the market that its program was worth the necessary investment. If the govern-
ment finances the program, it thereby second-guesses the market.
Just as a council would have to outguess the market, so would a federal
industrial bank. 9 In essence, industrial policy proposals would substitute the
judgment of government for the judgment of the marketplace.
12. See CENTER FOR NAT'L POLICY, supra note 6, at 14-15.
13. H.R. 4360, supra note 3, at § 202(b)(5).
14. CENTER FOR NAT'L POLICY, supra note 6, at 14.
15. Id. at 10.
16. H.R. 4360, supra note 3, at § 2(a)(12).
17. THE NAT'L HOUSE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, supra note 4, at 26.
18. CENTER FOR NAT'L POLICY, supra note 6, at 10.
19. A company or industry would request assistance from a federal industrial bank only if it could
not gain access to capital at a reasonable cost in the private market. By providing funds to the
applicant, the government bank is guessing that the market is wrong. Moreover, since its funds would
be limited, the bank would have to rank applicants as to the likelihood of success, in effect choosing
winners.
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HI. THE MARKET VS. A GOVERNMENT COUNCIL
We oppose these conceptions of an industrial policy because we believe the
market identifies competitive technologies and industries more accurately than
the government over the long term. An industrial policy as proposed would prop
up inefficient industries and inhibit the growth of competitive industries.
A. Government Councils in Theory
The marketplace will identify winners and losers more accurately than a gov-
ernment council over the long term for three reasons. First, the U.S. market
contains millions of investors and consumers who have better access than any
government council could to diverse information about the competitive potential
of specific technologies or industries. In general, the information about a tech-
nology or industry that would be available to a government council already would
be available to the market. Moreover, a government council with 20 or 30
individuals based in Washington, D.C. (even with support from the Department
of Commerce) could hardly be expected to have as much accurate information
about the virtually unlimited number of potentially competitive technologies or
industries or the potential for revitalizing industries as all the scientists, en-
gineers, entrepreneurs, managers, marketing analysts, venture capitalists, bank-
ers, and investment analysts in the market.
Second, the private sector has a greater incentive to use the available informa-
tion more wisely than a government council. In the market, an individual has a
strong incentive to pick winners because his or her money is at stake. A venture
capitalist with several million dollars riding on an investment needs no encour-
agement to analyze information thoroughly. Contrast this incentive with that of a
member of a government council trying to pick winners. The member's own
money is not at stake. Moreover, the likely short tenure of most members com-
bined with the long lead times necessary for the success of most investment
projects reduces the incentive to be accurate.
Third, a government council is more likely to be risk averse than private
investors. In fact, most industrial policy proposals explicitly call for consensus
building.20 A council would likely strive for a consensus consistent with conven-
tional wisdom and reject the kind of idiosyncratic information that is the basis for
many entrepreneurial opportunities.
B. Government Councils in Practice
It is not clear that government councils in practice outguess the market over the
long run. Industrial policy proponents usually point to several prominent exam-
ples of Japanese success in identifying future growth technologies and industries.
Some anecdotal evidence does suggest that the Japanese Government has man-
aged to target some industries successfully through MITI.
At the same time, however, other evidence suggests the government's inability
to outguess the market. Industrial policy proponents usually do not cite the
20. See THE NAT'L HOUSE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS, supra note 4, at 25.
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failures of MITI and governments other than the Japanese in trying to outguess
the market. MITI, for instance, miscalculated the competitive potential of the
Japanese automobile, aluminum, and aircraft industries.
In the case of the Japanese auto industry, MITI initially thought that the
industry had to consolidate to compete against foreign producers.2' During the
1950s and 1960s, MITI attempted but failed to consolidate the industry around
the two largest producers, Toyota and Nissan. MITI believed that the existence of
numerous Japanese producers limited the ability of individual producers to
achieve sufficient economies of scale and experience to compete with American
producers. In fact, Honda, Toyo Kogyo, and other Japanese producers as well as
Toyota and Nissan successfully compete today against foreign, including Ameri-
can, producers. MITI incorrectly calculated that a Japanese auto industry with
more than two chosen winners would fail to achieve international com-
petitiveness.
MITI also targeted the Japanese aluminum industry for growth and tried to
improve its competitiveness. Unfortunately for the industry and MITI, aluminum
smelting is a highly energy intensive process. The high electricity costs for
aluminum refining in Japan (three to four times higher than those in the U.S. and
eleven to fifteen times higher than those in Canada)22 severely hindered the
competitiveness of the Japanese aluminum industry. Japanese imports of alumi-
num rose from 39.3 percent of domestic production in 1977 to 120.0 percent in
1981.23 MITI miscalculated the cost structure of the industry and overinvested
public resources in aluminum. Despite MITI's targeting, the Japanese aluminum
industry is not a winner.
MITI targeted the commercial aircraft industry in the early postwar years, 24
and invested public funds in the production of the YS- 11, a twin engine turboprop
designed for short flights. The Japanese industry eventually halted production
and the government wrote off $100 million in loans when it became clear that
MITI had miscalculated the demand for such an aircraft.
Some industrial policy advocates point to European industrial targeting as
justification for adopting an industrial policy in the U.S. without assessing
whether this industrial targeting has succeeded. Apparently, European industrial
policies have been remarkably unsuccessful thus far. There are numerous exam-
ples of industries or products targeted and heavily subsidized by European gov-
ernments that have failed to become fully competitive even with the subsidies,
including the British-French Concorde, the French-British-West German Airbus,
the British semiconductor industry, and the French computer industry.
Reliance on the government to outguess the market can be costly in two
respects. First, the government could invest public resources and encourage
private capital to invest in technologies that are uncompetitive. For example,
Congress in 1980 appropriated $12.2 billion to establish the Synthetic Fuels
21. See 1. MAGAZINER & T. HOUT, JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL POLICY 73-74 (1981).
22. See INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH DEP'T, THE LONG-TERM CREDIT BANK OF JAPAN, (THE FUTURE
OF THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY) Nos. 57-59 (1982) (in Japanese).
23. See J. WHEELER, M. JANOW & T. PEPPER, JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN
THE 1980's: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT 179 (1982).
24. See Lohr, JAPAN'S VENTURE WITH BOEING, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1984, at 29.
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Corporation to accelerate the development of commercial scale synthetic fuel
plants through a variety of subsidies, including price, purchase, and loan guaran-
tees.25 When synfuel projects were started in the late 1970s, many believed that
the price of energy would rise to a level at which synfuels would become eco-
nomical. Nevertheless, the market expressed less confidence in synfuels than the
government as demonstrated by the market's substantially smaller investment in
synfuels.16 Now with the price of energy relatively low, synfuels are highly
uncompetitive and substantial private capital encouraged by government guaran-
tees are tied up in unutilized facilities.
Government overinvested public resources in the U.S. supersonic transport
(SST) commercial aircraft project. The federal government had sunk more than
$1 billion in the SST (including termination costs) by the time Congress voted in
March 1971 to end government financing of the project.27 Although the private
sector refused to invest resources in supersonic travel, some government officials
were willing to second guess the market.28 The federal government assumed that
the demand for supersonic travel would be larger or the costs of production lower
than private sector projections. With the experience of the British-French Con-
corde as a guide, it seems safe to say that the market was right.
Second, the government could fail to invest resources in competitive technolo-
gies. For example, would the Department of Commerce or a government council,
located in Washington, D.C. have bet in 1976 on Steven Jobs, the founder of
Apple Computer, whose company in Cupertino, California grew out of a group
called the Homebrew Computer Club?2 9 Probably not. Yet some private inves-
tors, thinking that personal computers would become a success, channeled ade-
quate amounts of capital into that industry.
The Japanese government once discouraged a small electronics company from
purchasing a license for American transistor technology. The company even-
tually succeeded in obtaining the license anyway. The firm's name is Sony.30
The failure of a government council to identify personal computers as a winner
would not be damaging in a free market system, but would be damaging under an
25. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1982, at 134 (1981).
26. For example, the nation's largest synfuel plant in Great Plains, North Dakota had to arrange for
a $2 billion loan guarantee from the Department of Energy after private lenders balked at financing
the project. See Ingrassia, Synfuels Project in North Dakota Troubled as Oil-Price Fall May Make it
Uneconomic, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1983 at 15.
27. See Senate Ends Federal Funding of Supersonic Aircraft, 29 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 688
(1971).
28. On the issue of public versus private financing of the aircraft, the congressional debate
included the following remarks: Representative Lawrence G. Williams (R-Pa.) supported the SST by
stating that "[wlith the production of the 300th SST, the federal government will have recovered all of
its money invested .... " Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.) argued that after more than $1 billion of
public investment, "if at that point the private market cannot decide [the SST] is worth going ahead
with, I say there is something wrong with it." Id. Arthur Okun, chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers under President Johnson, testified, "The very fact that proponents of the SST have turned to
the federal government for funds is evidence itself that the SST does not pass the market test." SST:
Failure of Intensive Lobbying Campaign, 29 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 719 (1971).
29. See The Updated Book of Jobs, TIME, Jan. 3, 1983, at 25, 26.
30. Pine, Industrial Policy? It's No Panacea in Japan, Wall St. J., Sept. 19, 1983, at i.
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industrial policy. By channeling funds toward uncompetitive technologies like
synfuels, a government raises the cost of capital and labor for technologies and
industries not targeted. For example, each government loan to a targeted industry
increases government demands on the credit markets and raises the borrowing
costs for competitive nontargeted industries.
IV. IMPLEMENTING AN INDUSTRIAL POLICY
For the sake of argument, let us assume that a government council can out-
guess the market over the long term. Could the government then channel
resources into technologies and industries that the council determined to be
competitive or would political pressures impel the government to spend most of
its resources propping up uncompetitive industries?
Inevitably, the government would be forced to channel most of its industrial
resources to uncompetitive industries. First, domestic industries whose com-
petitiveness is declining relative to that of foreign industries will lobby harder for
government assistance than emerging, more competitive, domestic industries.
Historically, uncompetitive industries like textiles and steel have sought govern-
ment assistance most actively. Under an industrial policy, these uncompetitive
industries would continue to lobby intensively for government assistance because
the potential cost to them of failing to obtain such assistance would be greater
than for more competitive industries. A personal computer firm with vast profit
opportunities in the market has less incentive to request government assistance
than a mature textile firm with declining profit margins. The creation of an
institution providing government assistance on a large scale would encourage
uncompetitive industries to request government assistance.
Second, not only are uncompetitive industries more likely to lobby for govern-
ment assistance, but if they are well established and large they are also more
likely to get it. In any industrial policy forum, the traditional large industries
usually possess greater political influence than the newer, smaller industries.
All of the major industrial policy proposals include councils comprising repre-
sentatives from management, labor, and government. Because traditional man-
ufacturing industries employ many more people and produce much more output
than emerging manufacturing industries, 3' in some ways it is appropriate that the
traditional industries be better represented on the council than emerging indus-
tries.
The distributuion of political power in our society would also result in the
council membership reflecting more the interests of traditional industries, than
31. Although it would not be very precise, one could use high technology industries as represen-
tative of emerging manufacturing industries and other manufacturing industries as representative of
traditional industries. Such a scheme would provide an order of magnitude estimate of the size of
emerging and traditional industries.
High technology industries employed about 21 percent of all wage and salary manufacturing
workers in 1980, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Department of Labor. They
produced about 21 percent of total industrial output in 1980, according to the Bureau of Industrial
Economics in the Department of Commerce.
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those of emerging industries. The White House and Congress would ultimately
select members of the council. A traditional industry like basic steel with about
330,000 workers throughout Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michi-
gan32 would be better able to marshall congressional and presidential support
than an emerging industry like robotics with only about 1,600 to 1,800 workers. 3
Moreover, large unions in traditional industries would be better represented on
the council than working men and women in emerging industries because tradi-
tional industries are more likely to be organized. Organized labor would be better
represented on the council despite the fact that only 23 percent of the American
labor force belongs to a union. 34
Instead of helping to develop an industrial strategy benefiting the public inter-
est, each council member would likely advocate measures benefiting his or her
constituency. Hence, the disparity in political power and presence of special
interests would almost certainly ensure that an industrial policy council would
allocate more government assistance to traditional industries than to emerging
ones.
Third, the government would inevitably invest most of its resources in uncom-
petitive industries because the government has a strong incentive to prevent firms
or industries from failing. A venture capitalist usually counts on a few winners to
generate large profits that exceed the cumulative losses of the many likely losers.
The overall profitability of the venture capitalist depends on its ability to predict a
few lucrative winners and cut its losses on the many losers. While a venture
capitalist can simply withdraw from an unprofitable investment, a government
industrial bank would face strong political pressures not to abandon a losing firm
or industry, particularly one that would not have started were it not for bank
support. Since the number of losers is likely to exceed the number of winners,
government unwillingness or inability to abandon the losers would result in most
of its resources being directed toward propping up uncompetitive firms and
industries.
Could a council fashion a consensus among management, labor, and govern-
ment for revitalizing a "declining" industry? Representatives of management
and labor would have a strong incentive to unite to press for greater import
protection and government subsidies because these steps impose no cost and
would generate the greatest short term benefits to the industry. Management and
labor would have little incentive to take positive long term steps such as manage-
ment changes and wage cuts, that could significantly revitalize the industry's
competitiveness because these changes require them to make substantial sacri-
fices.
Japan's experience illustrates the difficulty of implementing an industrial pol-
32. See BUREAU OF INDUS. ECONOMICS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1983 U.S. INDUSTRIAL
OUTLOOK 18-19 (1983).
33. While it is difficult to develop an estimate since robotics firms are often subsidiaries of larger
companies, this rough estimate was derived by the Office of Producer Goods, Bureau of Industrial
Economics, Department of Commerce.
34. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1982-83 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE U.S., at 409 (1982).
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icy designed to target winners.35 If MITI could channel resources to future
winners as successfully as industrial policy proponents argue, then one could
assume that of those funds in the Japanese Government budget spent on indus-
tries, a substantial proportion would be spent on industries targeted by MITI. In
fact, in the Japanese Government fiscal 1982 budget only 12 percent of the
outlays (about $2 billion) spent on all industries was directed toward MITI's
targeted industries.3 6 These targeted industries included computers, civil avia-
tion, and biotechnology. Almost 90 percent of government funds spent on indus-
try in general was directed toward traditional industries like agriculture and
railroads, hardly winners in the economic sense.
The Japanese Government has financed relatively little of the research and
development expenditures of Japanese high technology industries. 37 The Jap-
anese Government provides research and development contracts, grants, and
subsidies totaling only 1.0, 0.3, 1.4, and 0.5 percent of the research and develop-
ment expenditures in the communication and electronic manufacturing, phar-
maceutical, industrial machinery, and precision equipment industries,
respectively. By contrast, the Japanese Government finances 18, 19, and 28
percent of the research and development expenditures in the agricultural, mining,
and transportation (railway, aircraft, and shipbuilding) industries respectively.
MITI is probably better suited than a comparable body in the U.S. to imple-
ment an industrial policy because the Japanese career bureaucracy is stronger
relative to political appointees than the U.S. bureaucracy. Also, the Japanese
executive branch is stronger vis-A-vis the legislative branch than the U.S. execu-
tive branch. 3 If the putatively more politically independent MITI cannot direct
most of the Japanese Government's resources toward winners, can we real-
istically expect a government body in the U.S. to do so?
Senator Proxmire (D-Wis.) explained the political difficulties inherent in an
industrial policy: "Money will go where the political power is .... It will go
where union power is mobilized. It will go where the campaign contributors want
it to go. It will go where the mayors and governors as well as congressmen and
senators have the power to push it. Anyone who thinks government funds will be
allocated to firms according to merit has not lived or served in Washington very
long. ""
In sum, an industrial policy aiming to revitalize uncompetitive industries and
to encourage the growth of competitive ones will likely result in government
35. For a detailed analysis of the direction of Japanese public resources toward winners, see
Trezise, Industrial Policy is Not the Major Reason for Japan's Success, BROOKINGS REV., Spring
1983, at 13. The author concludes: "[lln Japan public funds have not been directed in any sizeable
amounts, relative to total investment requirements, to the private industries or economic sectors with
high growth potential." Id. at 18.
36. See MINISTRY OF FINANCE, FINANCIAL AND MONETARY STATISTICS MONTHLY, (June 1982)
(in Japanese); JAPAN INFORMATION PROCESSING DEV. Ass'N, Computer White Paper (1982) (in
Japanese).
37. G. Saxonhouse, Tampering with Comparative Advantage in Japan? (June 15, 1983) (statement
before the International Trade Commission).
38. E. VOGEL, JAPAN As NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR AMERICA 54-55 (1979).
39. Bartlett, The Old Politico of a New Industrial Policy, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1983, at 34, col. 5.
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investing most of its resources in propping up the former at the expense of the
latter.
V. WHY ARE THE JAPANESE COMPETITIVE?
Given the difficulties of formulating and implementing an industrial policy,
one should be skeptical of assertions that an industrial policy is the primary
reason for Japanese success. Instead of attributing strong Japanese com-
petitiveness primarily to its industrial policy, one should consider other factors
that could explain Japanese success at least as plausibly as industrial policy.
(1) High savings rate. The Japanese historically save a much higher proportion
of their income than people in many other industrialized countries, including the
U.S. Household savings as a percent of household disposable income is about
22.5 percent in Japan, while the U.S. figure is only about 5.9 percent. 40 A
number of factors explain the high Japanese savings rate, including strong tax
incentives; the need to save for retirement (the Japanese have no real equivalent to
our social security system), children's education (Japan has a very competitive
and expensive private school system), and housing (the scarcity of land makes
housing costs high); the emphasis on semiannual bonuses paid most workers;
and, perhaps the cultural frugality of the Japanese. But whatever the reasons, this
high savings rate increases the pool of available funds for investment and hence
reduces the cost of capital to Japanese industry. One recent study estimates that
the cost of capital in the U.S. is more than three times that in Japan.
41
(2) Strong export orientation. Perhaps because of their heavy dependence on
external sources for raw materials, the Japanese, since the Meiji Restoration,
have generally thought of business in terms of world markets. Japanese manufac-
turers typically build their exports to the U.S. with the American consumer in
mind. Many American manufacturers fail to do the same for the Japanese or
other foreign consumer.
(3) A highly motivated labor force that relates well with management. An
observer of auto assembly lines in the U.S. and Japan once remarked: "The
American factory seems almost like an armed camp. Foremen stand guard to
make sure workers do not slack off. Workers grumble at foremen, and foremen
are cross with workers. In the Japanese factory, employees seem to work even
without the foreman watching. Workers do not appear angry at superiors and
actually seem to hope their company succeeds.", 42 This labor-management rela-
tionship improves the productivity of Japanese companies.
(4) Sound management practices. One crucial factor that has not received as
much attention as industrial policy is how management practices contribute to
strong Japanese competitiveness. The ability to make products more efficiently
than anyone else often enables the Japanese to outcompete other countries.
Moreover, effective management practices enable the Japanese to develop com-
40. See Eismeier, The Red Japanese Miracle, J. CoNTEMP. STUD., Fall 1982, at 36.
41. See G. HATSOPOULOS, HIGH COST OF CAPITAL: HANDICAP OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 37
(1983).
42. E. VOGEL, supra note 38, at 131.
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petitive high technology industries and make their older industries more com-
petitive. The importance of superior management is illustrated by the cost
difference between American and Japanese cars. An analysis by Harbour and
Associates in Michigan found that in 1981 Japanese automakers had a cost advan-
tage of about $2,200 over American automakers in producing subcompact cars. 43
The study attributed a portion of that difference to lower wages, better labor-
management relations, and superior technology. But better management systems
was by far the most important factor. Practices such as zero defects quality
systems, just-in-time production (kanban), and broader job classifications ac-
counted for over 60 percent of the cost difference. For example, U.S. automakers
required about 31 hours to assemble a passenger subcompact car. By contrast, a
Japanese producer assembled a subcompact car in only about 15 hours. The
Harbour analysis attributed this advantage principally to management systems
and techniques. 44
These management systems are not related to government actions. It is difficult
to see how an industrial policy of targeting resources to the auto industry could
account for the Japanese manufacturers adopting a kanban system, for example.
The primary responsibility for instituting better management practices lies with
management and labor, not government.
VI. THE APPROPRIATE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE ECONOMY
The possibility that factors other than industrial policy could more plausibly
explain Japanese competitiveness has significant implications for the role of the
U.S. Government in stimulating industrial competitiveness. The appropriate role
for the U.S. Government is not to target specific technologies or industries.
Whether targeting means anticipating changes in the marketplace or accelerating
the development of industries that the marketplace has already picked as winners,
government should not be in the business of targeting. 45 As discussed above, the
market will do a better job than government in both predicting those technologies
and industries that will be most competitive and directing the necessary resources
toward them.
In general, government measures affecting industries should apply broadly
across all industries, whether they be basic or high technology, labor intensive or
capital intensive, small or large. Admittedly, just as it would be difficult to resist
pressures from politically powerful traditional industries in order to direct re-
sources toward the emerging industries, it would be tough to ignore the pressures
43. See HARBOUR AND ASSOCIATES, INC., ANALYSIS OF THE JAPANESE LANDED COST ADVAN-
TAGE FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF SUBCOMPACT CARS (1982).
44. See id. at 14.
45. In fact, by the time the government has decided that the market identified a winner, the market
usually is already allocating sufficient resources to that winner. The argument that one could let the
market pick the winner and simply have government "nudge" the market along sounds appealing.
However, since capital already flows to those investments yielding the highest returns, any additional
government capital either would displace private capital that would have been invested anyway or
would add capital to the industry that it could not absorb because if the industry could absorb
additional capital, private dollars would have flowed in.
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from those industries in order to assure that government industrial measures
remain neutral. 46 One could argue that the government already targets industries
through special tax breaks, for example, and instead of continuing to subsidize
the "declining" industries, it would be more rational to shift subsidies to
"emerging" industries.
There are three reasons for preferring measures that are neutral, rather than
selective. First, it is probably easier to develop a consensus for measures that do
not discriminate among industries than it is to develop a consensus for measures
favoring specific industries, particularly if the targeted industries have small
constituencies (as most emerging industries do). The public would be more
willing to support policies allowing all industries the same opportunity to benefit
from government measures. Second, if the status quo is to be changed, it is better
to move toward a neutral system of government measures because the market has
an advantage over the government in identifying competitive technologies and
industries. Third, the current system of selective government measures is now
considered an ad hoc approach. Legitimizing a system of selective government
measures would encourage American business to concentrate more resources on
Washington lobbying for special spending programs, tax exemptions, and other
federal subsidies, diverting attention and resources from real business activities.
American business should spend less time figuring out how to persuade a senator
to vote for a special tax exemption and more time discovering how to design,
make, and sell widgets more profitably.
The marketplace must have the dominant role in improving U.S. industrial
competitiveness because it indeed is the dynamic and guiding force in our econ-
omy. But the government should help strengthen the foundation of the market and
enhance market flexibility. There are three specific roles the government should
play.
(1) The federal government should support sound fiscal and monetary policy at
home and abroad to encourage sustained noninflationary economic growth. By
lowering inflation and real interest rates, a sound macroeconomic policy will
lower the cost of capital for all industries, thereby facilitating the movement of
capital into emerging industries and enabling traditional industries to modernize.
Sustained economic growth will provide markets for new products and employ-
ment opportunities for workers displaced by new technologies and people enter-
ing the labor force. Other macroeconomic factors for which the government is
responsible are overall levels of savings and investment. By encouraging greater
savings and investment, government can increase the total amount of capital
formation in the U.S. for all industries.
(2) The government should make those investments in the economy whose
social returns exceed private returns. For example, in technology, certain kinds
of generic research benefit such a wide segment of society that individual firms
46. By neutral, we mean measures that are applied indiscriminately across firms or industries.
Clearly, nearly all measures affect individual firms or industries differently. For example, a company
making profits benefits more from a tax credit than a company losing money. However, by applying
measures indiscriminately, government allows the market to determine which firms benefit from the
measure.
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cannot hope to reap all the benefits. As a result, firms will conduct less generic
research than that amount which society finds beneficial. Likewise, in education,
it is unlikely that a company would teach an individual important basic math
skills beyond those of which the company itself can take advantage.
Investments in programs which generate social returns exceeding private re-
turns are legitimate government responsibilities. It is unnecessary to establish a
tripartite council or government industrial bank to make these types of invest-
ments since government already invests in these programs.
(3) The government should enhance the efficiency of the market by reducing
barriers of entry and exit into and out of all markets. By increasing the ease with
which resources, whether labor, capital, or technology, can move into and out of
markets, the government would assure that resources flow toward those industries
and sectors of our economy that can use them most efficiently. A free flow of
resources allows resources to move where they are most productive and increases
the incentives for individual firms to remain competitive. Barriers that restrict a
free flow of resources can include government regulations restricting entry at
home or trade barriers at home and abroad.
We should recognize, though, that government can only do so much; ulti-
mately the private sector must do the job. For example, government could en-
courage greater savings and investment, but management and labor must run the
machines and train the workers effectively. If American management and labor
use equipment inefficiently, hold excess inventories, or establish restrictive work
rules, no amount of government intervention will increase efficiency.
VII. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S RECORD
Following the general approach outline above, the Reagan Administration has
implemented a number of policies.
A. Strengthening the Foundation of the Private Market.
With respect to fundamental macroeconomic elements, the Administration has
been dramatically successful in helping reduce inflation and interest rates and
increasing employment. The growth rate in the consumer price index has de-
clined from 12.4 percent in 1980 to 3.8 percent in 1983. The prime rate has fallen
from 21.5 percent in January 1981 to 13.0 percent in July 1984. The economy
experienced a 6.2 percent increase in real gross national product from the fourth
quarter of 1982 to the fourth quarter of 1983. The economy generated a net
employment gain of about 6.7 million jobs from the end of the 1981-1982
recession to June 1984, the largest increase in total civilian employment during
any nineteen month recovery period since the end of World War II. The Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) 47 in 1981 reduced marginal individual income
47. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981) (codified, as
amended in various sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter referred to as ERTA].
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and capital gains tax rates" and increased deductions for retirement savings, 49 all
of which encourage more personal savings than prior law. ERTA also accelerated
depreciation allowances and enhanced the investment tax credit,5 0 which when
combined with the lower inflation rate encourages higher levels of investment.
While the strength of the U.S. dollar has helped finance investment by attract-
ing foreign capital, it has also reduced the competitiveness of U.S. exports and
increased the competitiveness of imports. The appropriate solution to the result-
ing trade imbalance is not erection of trade barriers or subsidization of exports,
but pursuit of appropriate fiscal and monetary policies. The Administration has
been working to reduce federal budget deficits and has supported money growth
at a moderate rate consistent with sustained noninflationary economic growth.
With respect to the microeconomic elements of the market's foundation, the
Administration has emphasized the need for investing in programs which gener-
ate social benefits exceeding private benefits, such as education, training, and
research and development.
We need to educate American youth in the fundamentals of science and math
so they possess the basic skills that are increasingly necessary in an age of rapidly
changing technology. To help achieve this goal, the Administration has called for
a renewed emphasis on the quality of our basic educational system. Our high
schools can probably better prepare our youth for careers by requiring them to
take a certain number of years of math and science. To meet the shortage of
qualified math and science teachers in our schools, the Administration has pro-
posed a new Department of Education and National Science Foundation (NSF)
programs in the fiscal year 1985 budget.
To retrain displaced workers, the Administration proposed $223 million in the
fiscal year 1983 budget for a grant program under the Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA)5' which the President proposed and signed into law in 1982. In
addition, the fiscal year budget provides $1.9 billion for a JTPA training block
grant to allow displaced workers to meet their specific training needs for real
private sector jobs. This block grant should enable states to train over one million
people in 1985. JTPA is more likely to succeed than earlier public sector training
programs because of greater private sector participation and emphasis on actual
training, instead of income maintenance.
Investment in basic research is a classic case in which social benefits exceed
private benefits. The lower rates of inflation and interest and sustained economic
growth will stimulate more private sector investment in research and develop-
ment. To encourage private sector research and development more directly,
ERTA included a new 25 percent tax credit for increased research and develop-
ment expenditures. 52 The Administration has also proposed legislation that would
48. See id. at §§ 101, 102.
49. See id. at §§ 311, 312.
50. See id. at §§ 201-14.
51. Job Training Partnership Act, Pub. L. No. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1322 (1982) [hereinafter referred to
as JPTA].
52. See ERTA, supra note 47, at § 221.
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amend the antitrust laws to encourage the establishment of procompetitive joint
research and development ventures. 3
To encourage more innovation in the patent and copyright area, the President
has directed federal agencies to allow nearly all federal research and development
contractors to own federally funded inventions. Previously, only small businesses
and nonprofit organizations could keep the patents on federally funded in-
ventions. In addition, the Administration has proposed legislation that would
encourage the procompetitive licensing of intellectual property and strengthen
process patents.
For those research and development projects which are appropriately federal
responsibilities, the fiscal year 1985 budget includes a proposed annual increase
of 14 percent to a level of $53 billion. For basic research, the President has
proposed a ten percent annual increase to $7.9 billion.
B. Enhancing Market Flexibility.
The Reagan Administration is pursuing a regulatory policy that seeks to pro-
vide greater flexibility within the economy. For example, the Administration
supported Federal Communication Commission proposals to deregulate the tele-
communications industry where technological change is making many regula-
tions obsolete. In addition, the Administration worked with Congress to
deregulate the financial services and intercity bus industries.14 The Administra-
tion has also reformed the Davis-Bacon Act (affecting employment on Federal
construction projects) and proposed deregulating natural gas. In 1982, the De-
partment of Justice issued a new set of merger guidelines designed to encourage
mergers enhancing economic efficiency, while still deterring mergers reducing
competition. 5 Finally, the President's proposed legislation amending the antitrust
laws for research and development joint ventures not only promotes more re-
search and development, but also recognizes the changing environment of inter-
national competition.
The Administration is dedicated to the cause of trade liberalization both at
home and abroad. For example, it rejected a highly publicized petition filed by
Houdaille Industries, Inc. that would have denied the U.S. investment tax credit
to U.S. taxpayers purchasing Japanese machine tools,5 6 initiated the Quad-
53. See H.R. 3878, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Currently, there exists a perception that courts
may find joint research and development ventures per se illegal. The President's proposed legislation
would require courts to consider joint research and development ventures under the rule of reason
standard and reduce the liability in an antitrust suit from treble to actual damages. See National
Productivity and Innovation Legislation, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1234-37 (Dec. 1, 1975).
54. See Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469
(1982); Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-261, 96 Stat. 1102 (1982).
55. See Justice Department Merger Guidelines, ANrITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1069
(June 17, 1982) (special supplement). The Justice Department recently issued further revised guide-
lines. See Justice Department Merger Guidelines, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1169
(June 14, 1984) (special supplement).
56. See Administration Denies Relief Requested by Houdaille, 8 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 124
(Apr. 27, 1983).
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rilateral mechanism which resulted in an agreement to accelerate the multilateral
trade negotiations tariff reductions, worked with Congress to enact the Caribbean
Basin Initiative,57 and vigorously opposed local content auto legislation. Regard-
ing the rise of protectionism abroad, the Administration is working in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development to reduce the many trade barriers hampering U.S. investment
abroad and U.S. exports of services and high technology goods.
President Reagan recently appointed a Commission on Industrial Com-
petitiveness to provide a forum in which to develop recommendations on public
sector actions to enhance the efficiency of the market and private sector actions to
improve industrial competitiveness. The recommendations of this Commission
were presented to the President in December 1984.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The industrial policy concept can look attractive on the surface. It promises to
restore U.S. industrial competitiveness by developing and implementing a na-
tional industrial strategy. However, it contains many fundamental flaws, includ-
ing the inability of the government to outguess the market and the improbability
of the government successfully implementing industrial targeting. There is a
more promising alternative. By strengthening the foundation of the marketplace
and enhancing its flexibility, the government can improve the market's ability to
identify winners and losers and allocate resources efficiently.
57. Interest & Dividend Tax Compliance Act of 1983-Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 369 (1983).
